This was not the basis of a plea for troops to the Security Council of the United Nations. It was not a convincing argument by the joint chiefs that the United States should send troops to Bosnia. It was said by British Prime Minister Disraeli in the House of Lords, August of 1878.

The causes of the Bosnian conflict lay in the tortured history of the region. Some are ancient, some more modern. To paraphrase the Nobel laureate Yugoslavian author Ivo Andric, "Hatred is in the very soil of Bosnia." In exploring the root causes of 'the Bosnian conflict, we can find explanations, but no excuses. These explanations may illuminate the problem, but do not cast light on an answer to a near insoluble situation.

Historical Basis of the Conflict

Historically, there have been four distinct and important events that have impacted on border definitions-or lack thereof-throughout the Balkans. The oldest dates back to 395 AD, when Caesar Theodosius I was the last ruler of a united Roman Empire. He was experiencing the all too familiar problems of a conquering empire that was spread too thin. The Roman legions were retreating from England. The bar barians-vandals, Visigoths and Huns-were pressuring the Empire from the northeast. In just 50 years, Attila would cross the Alps and invade Italy. The collection of taxes and tribute from the vast Empire was an ever-present problem.

To relieve some of the administrative burden, he divided the Empire into eastern and western parts. Rome administered the western part from Rome. The eastern half of the Empire was to be administered from Constantinople. The east-west dividing line was equidistant between Rome and Constantinople and ran right through the Balkans.

The second critical event happened 400 years later in the late 700s and early 800s when Pope Leo III was the last head of a unified Roman Catholic Church. Like Caesar Theodosius before him, enormous political and religious pressures beset him. Consider that Mohammed had made his hegira from Mecca to Medina (622 AD) and in just 10 years had converted all of the Arabian Peninsula. By 700 AD, the Mohammedans were masters of the Persian and Egyptian Empires and had conquered all of Syria and Palestine. By mid-century they had crossed the Straits of Gibraltar and conquered Spain and had crossed the Pyrenees and were into southern France. Theirs was a slightly different kind of evangelism! Death to the non-believer (infidels) was often the order of the day.

For very similar administrative reasons, it was agreed that the west Roman Empire would be Christianized by Rome and thus became Roman Catholic, while the east part would be Christianized by Constantinople and thus became Orthodox, Again, it was a division of administrative chores with the full concurrence of both the Pope and the Patriarch of Constantinople. The line of division ran right through the Balkans.

The third defining event occurred when long latent antagonism between Greek-speaking and Latin-speaking Catholics grew steadily worse until, in 1054, Orthodox Constantinople declared its independence from Rome. Thus followed the first great, and possibly the deepest, schism in Christianity. For the sake of understanding, the depth and reality of this division cannot be underestimated. To be sure, it is a generalization-a Russian is a Russian and a Serb is a Serb because they are Orthodox and, likewise, a Pole is a Pole and a Croat is a Croat because they are Roman Catholic. This has absolutely no bearing on whether or not either ever goes to church-or, for that matter, even knows his faith. As a consequence, the national thinking of each group is oriented to the East or to the West (e.g. Poland, among many other reasons, believes they should be in NATO because they think of themselves as Western European). North America and Western Europe are more distant and even indifferent. But in order to understand the animosities in the Balkans, the significance and depth of this religious division must be understood. The dividing line fell right through the Balkans.

The fourth and last defining point in the history of the Balkans is marked by the incursion of the Ottoman Empire. The Turks, under a series of Mohammedan leaders, swept through the Balkans as they had done in the seventh and eighth centuries on the Iberian Peninsula. The Turks have left their indelible mark on the Balkan Peninsula to this day. They were relatively unchecked until their naval defeat at the Battle of Lepanto in 1571. This defeat-by the Knights of Malta- ended Ottoman naval supremacy. One hundred years later, under Kara Mustafa, the Ottoman armies were defeated at the gates of Vienna. The hero of the battle in 1683 was Jan Sobieski, the future king of Poland. This marked the furthest penetration of Islam into Europe. The significance of this battle to western European history, as we know it today, cannot be emphasized enough. Islamic influence on western culture would be far greater now, had the battle for Vienna gone the other way.

In sum, four distinct historical events, starting 1,600 years ago, divided the Balkan Peninsula; first east to west, then south to north by invasion and retreat of yet another religious ethos.

The ensuing 150 to 200 years of Balkan history following the decisive battle of Vienna, were largely ones of contentious feuding and animosity between the religious factions. Outside political influence and economic interests determined ever-changing borders. The influence was primarily from the Austrian/Hungarian Empire to the north, and included the areas of Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia--Herzegovina. Turkish, Bulgarian and Greek interests were felt in the areas of Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia. This division was roughly east/west and falls generally along the line first set down in division of the Roman Empire in 395. It was the state of affairs on the Balkan Peninsula that lead Prime Minister Disraeli to his exasperated commentary, quoted at the beginning of this article. Had the two opposing empires been even remotely willing to create a federation of states equitable to the various ethnic entities, many wars could have been avoided and much bloodshed would have been saved. Regrettably, their interests were elsewhere.

Modern Historical Background

The plight of the peoples of the Balkan states was not served well by the end of either of the "great" wars. Following WWI, the winners deter-mined unstable borders. Serbia made generous territorial claims as part of the winning side. Hungary, on the losing side, lost Transylvania to Romania. Slovenia, Croatia and Dalmatia became the newly created state of Yugoslavia. The end of WWII introduced a whole new and very rigid political order. Under the Soviet sphere of influence, no Balkan state could adjust or contest their geographical borders. This period following WWII could be viewed as a time of enforced stability.

In Yugoslavia, there was a consolidation of existing political entities under the dictatorial control of a Soviet puppet, Josip Broz Tito. Alternately praised and vilified by the west, Tito's Yugoslavia was the most "open" and liberal of all Communist countries. He accepted loans from the West and little guidance from Moscow. He ruled by developing a strong army, a large secret service and a shrewd political sense. Born a Croat in a country with a numerical Serb majority, he had an uncanny knack of keeping a tight reign by judicious political appointments. It was a very effective ethnic balancing act.

The Republics of the former Yugoslavia under Tito were (in roughly north to south orientation) Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia (including the annexed Province of Voivoclina and the former autonomous Region of Kosovo), Montenegro and Macedonia. During Tito's 40 plus years as dictator, the world believed that there was a great degree of ethnic peace and stability in that part of the Balkans. This "enforced" peace brought a degree of economic growth and security. Under Tito, Yugoslavia led the world's "unaligned" nations, i.e. not aligned with the East-West superpower nations. Tito's last contribution to his legacy was in 1974 when he oversaw

In the adoption of a new constitution. In it, he planned for his succession by pro-viding for a collective, rotating presidency, equal representation of republics and autonomous provinces and the right of veto by the republics. Tito died in 1980.

Tito's influence on Yugoslav history lasted approximately 45 years, until 1985, when internal forces irrevocably headed toward the unraveling of the fabric of social order. The frightening complexity of Yugoslavian ethnic com-position, which had been largely forgot-ten during Tito's time, began to reveal itself. After much political infighting, the decline of the communist party and the rise of ethnic nationalism, two men emerged as the major power players, Franjo Trudjman of Croatia and Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia. In the ensuing couple of years, both men gained and consolidated their power bases.

Starting in mid-1989, events started to happen at a dizzying rate with deteriorating consequences. Milosevic annexed the province of Voivodina, extended his power in Montenegro and revoked the autonomous status of the Kosovo Province-which was shrewdly granted by Tito.

In 1990, the last Yugoslav Communist congress ended in turmoil, Serbia suspended the Kosovo government and parliament, and the newly ratified Croatian constitution changed the status of the Serbs living in Croatia.

In 1991, Trudjman and Milosevic met secretly to plan the partition of Bosnia and conflict broke out in Croatia-first deaths of the war. Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence. The Yugoslav army (under Milosevic's direction) intervened in Slovenia. Twelve days later, the Serb army was defeated and left. The U.N. declared an arms embargo, which primarily affected the Muslims. The Serbian bloc (under Milosevic) took over the collective Yugoslav presidency. Bosnia voted for sovereignty. Milosevic incited Serbs in Bosnia and Croatia to declare their solidarity and independence (to forestall the breakup of all of Yugoslavia and to form a greater Serbia). Germany and then the European Community (EU) recognized the independent states of Slovenia and Croatia.

Croatia

In mid to late 1991, President Milosevic released the dogs of war. In blatant moves to increase both a political power base and territorial claims, he incited the murderously nationalistic Serbs in Croatia to rebel and proclaim self-rule. Aided by the army of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (which had control of most of Tito's military machine), the Serbs captured or gained control of one-third of Croatia. There were many documented massacres perpetrated by the Serbian forces during this period. The crown of shame seems to be the city of Vukovar, located in the northeast corner of the boomerang-shaped country-an area called eastern Slavonia.

The Serbs systematically destroyed the city, street by street, house by house. This tactic was used often in Bosnia and in Kosovo. While the slaughter of innocent civilians is what captures the attention and emotions of the world community, it is the destruction of homes and villages that is the real ethnic cleansing. People are left homeless with nowhere to return; they are displaced. This is why homes and villages are destroyed-not because they are rebel "strongholds". It is the one-half million displaced persons (DPs) of all ethnic backgrounds that are the primary humanitarian and political problem in the former Yugoslavia. While Kosovo is now on the world's "front burner" of attention, the residual of the last eight years is cumulative. Back to Croatia.

Following the Yugoslav-supported uprising of the Serbs in one-third of Croatia, the fighting was so bitter and the atrocities so numerous by all three ethnic groups that the United Nations declared these areas United Nations Protection Areas (UNPAs). The U.N. force that was deployed was called UNPROFOR (United Nations Protection Force). The area of Croatia, so "protected," was divided into sectors-north, south, east and west. The stalemate lasted from April 1992 until

March 1995. In two very swift opera-tions (Flash and Storm) in May and August 1995, the Croat army pushed the Serbs out of Croatian sectors, Sector East. International pressure to end the bloodshed was so great that the Croats and Serbs living in Sector East (main city: Vukovar) agreed to a two-year, U.N.-controlled, transitional administration. This ended in January 1998 and was the most successful U.N. operation. The Croatian borders are now restored. But what about the human cost of displacement? In the very small area of Sector East (Eastern Slavonia) in the relatively small country of Croatia, the U.N. High Commissioner For Refugees estimated the following: Around 85,000 people, mainly Croats, left the region because of the war, while some 67,000 Serbs, mostly from other parts of Croatia, moved in. Under the terms of the Basic Dayton Agreement, 60,000-70,000 displaced persons, mostly Croats, could return to the region. In a word, the aim was to restore approximate pre-war ethnic distribution in the region and the recognition of Croatia as the sovereign government.

The crass reality is, how are displaced Croats, now living in other parts of Croatia, to be relocated back into their houses, which are now being occupied by Serbs who will in turn be displaced? Further, Milosevic doesn't want the Serbs from Croatia to come to Serbia, because it worsens his already strained economic and domestic problems and worse, it is a painful reminder of his failed excursion into Croatia. Lastly is the painful human drama of the Serbs whose home for generations has been in Croatia. With the departure of the U.N. Transitional Administration, they have little recourse against their inhospitable Croatian neighbors whose land they tried to claim-and failed.

Bosnia-Herzegovina

How very sad it is for Bosnia. Why, of the six former republics of Yugoslavia, is Bosnia the main one that we hear about? Why are we in Bosnia?

Bosnia was unique among the six former republics of the Yugoslav federation. In fact, it was unique among all of the other states of the Balkans. It was the only political entity that was totally ethnically balanced. Every other state had very few ethnic minorities. That is, Croatia and Slovenia average only seven percent minority, the remaining 93 percent are Croats and Slovenes. Serbia has only 15 percent minorities. All other Balkan nations (i.e. Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey and Albania) have only about 15 percent minorities. In a way, Bosnia's greatest weakness has been its multi-ethnicity. Prior to the war, it was almost exactly equally divided between Serb, Croat, Muslim-each having one-third of the population.

It is because of its lack of a dominant ethnic identity, that Bosnia has been at the mercy of the outside political force of a particular time. In the time of Ottoman dominance, most of Bosnia was Muslim. When the Serbs pushed the Ottoman Empire out, the Muslims remained and were amalgamated. With the rise of the Austro-Hungarian political dominance, Bosnia was absorbed into Croatia. What had evolved was a kind of adjusted co-existence instead of any true integration. When Tito defined Bosnia (Constitution of 1974) as a state of three peoples, he was judiciously using Bosnia as a linchpin of his ethnic balancing act.

When Milosevic fed the flames of nationalism in 1991-1992, he incited the Serbs in Bosnia, which has a long border with Serbia, to revolt. On the Croat side, they too saw the advantage of claiming "their part" of Bosnia. The major losers in the war for Bosnia are the Muslims, who had no outside benefactor state. For the next three years, old and deep-seated ethnic hatreds flared. Atrocities became common on all sides of the conflict. To the horror of a watching world, the bestial savagery of "ethnic cleansing" became nightly television fare and household words. it should be pointed out that while those atrocities done by the Croats and the Muslims were heinous, they were, in most instances, reflexive or in retaliation for what was done to them. Only the Serbs used "ethnic cleansing" as an instrument of national policy. Clear and damning evidence of this policy is now seen in Kosovo.

While ethnic hatreds have run deep and long, the immediate cause of the Bosnian blood-bath are the ambitions of Slobodan Milosevic. While Tito unified modern Yugoslavia, keeping ethnic unrest under a tight leash, Milosevic used ethnic distrust to tear the country apart. When he came to power in a democratic election fraught with numerous irregularities, he quickly and brutally suppressed all domestic opposition. He promoted a foreign policy that was very nationalistic and racist. He adroitly played on European fears of instability in the Balkans, Muslim fundamentalism and the possibility of a ground war. In the ensuing three years, until the summer of 1995, using the supposed poor treatment of ethnic Serbs as an excuse, he launched aggressive campaigns in Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia. These were out-right invasions or direct support of ethnic Serb operations. Serbian forces operated in these countries despite clear violations of international law, diplomatic and economic pressures and the threats of embargoes brought by the United Nations. Again, reminiscent of the prelude to WWII, the major European powers proved unwilling to directly confront Milosevic and his territorial gains. However, there was no lack of "strong statements" condemning aggression and "real concern" for the plight of those peasants (mostly women and children) brought under Serbian rule.

Serbian aggression was further emboldened by the absence of any consistent and forceful resolve on the part of western European governments or the United States. Serb success and the west's weakness led the Bosnian Serb government (under President Radovan Karadic) to believe that it could act with impunity toward the international community. A number of acts by the Serbs followed which finally presaged the end; they were: taking U.N. peacekeepers as hostages and using them as human shields, shelling U.N, safe havens, continued ethnic cleansing, and mass execution of refugees from Srebrenica. All of this provoked a measured and limited response by NATO known as Operation Deliberate Force.

In the end, the NATO alliance, led by the United States, determined that the costs of inaction far outweighed the costs of intervention. A number of factors led to this conclusion. The human carnage caused by the Serbs was becoming outrageous. Western credibility was being destroyed, The threat of Muslim nations unilaterally lifting the arms embargo, and lastly, growing domestic pressure in the U.S. and Europe to take some action. A peace agreement was signed as the Dayton Peace Accords. The Serbs, Croats and Muslims divided Bosnia with a tortured border, giving about one-half to the Serbs, which they have named Republika Srpska. The other half is the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which includes both Croats and Muslims. The capital is a tri-patriate city of Sarejevo. There is a rotating presidency of the three parties, ironically reminiscent of what Tito set up in 1994 for Yugoslavia.

Kosovo

The last agony in Yugoslavia's tortured history is Kosovo. It is also one of the strangest-a sacred monument to defeat. For nationalist Serbs, Kosovo is so holy in their mythology that possession of it is vital to their survival. Kosovo was part of the original Serb heartland and it was there that, in 1389, the Ottoman Turks defeated the Serbs' greatest hero, Prince Lazar, at the Field of Blackbirds. The Muslims ruled Serbia for the next 500 years, but Prince Lazar is revered because he chose death rather than the dishonor of surrender.

Serbia regained its independence from the Ottomans in the 19th century. As soon as it had strength, Serbia declared war on the Turks and recaptured Kosovo in 1912. The majority of the population-about 90 percent-has been Albanian Muslim since 1689, when 30,000 Orthodox Christian Serbs fled after the Ottomans beat back an Austrian invasion. Serb nationalism was suppressed after WWII, when Tito was trying to weld the six republics into a united Yugoslavia. Kosovo was given a degree of independence. When Tito died, Slobodan Milosevic whipped Serb nationalism into a frenzy in care-fully orchestrated massive demonstrations demanding an end to Muslim dominance in Kosovo. He revoked Kosovo's autonomous status and absorbed it totally into Serbia.

Now Milosevic is faced with the ultimate desire of re-incorporating Kosovo into an ethnically pure greater Serbia. Left alone, he would simply "cleanse" the province of all Albanians. However, nearly 90 percent of the population is Albanian. Further, his dilemma is com-pounded by the fact that displaced Albanians are unwelcome in Albania and neighboring Macedonia because their fragile economies are already stretched to the breaking point. Also, the Serbs from other war-torn areas of the former Yugoslavia are reluctant to move into war-ravaged Kosovo merely to lend ethnic purity to the area. Through it all, Milosevic considers this an "internal affair." The international community threatens force, eloquently condemns and generally shifts its weight from one foot to another in an endless dance to avoid direct confrontation to stop crimes against humanity, which should respect no national borders. The frightening similarities to the prelude to the holocaust are unmistakable.

Tomorrow's History

As we have seen, there have been very few periods of unbroken peace in the history of the Balkans. Taking a long historical view, this latest war was yet another border realignment. The blood that was so abundantly shed came from people of the same country, who spoke the same language and had lived together for many generations. It has been said that civil war is the ugliest war. The adage was certainly confirmed in the war that tore Yugoslavia apart.

Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Macedonia and Montenegro have agreed upon borders. In Bosnia, while the signatories to the Dayton Peace Accord established contorted (gerrymandered) borders and agreed to stop fighting, it has taken the presence of 35,000 U.N. troops to ensure the same. It is a bit reminiscent of Disraeli's observation!

What will happen when the international community tires of supporting this "baby-sitting" force? The September 1998 elections in Bosnia give an ominous hint. The ultra-nation-alist Nikola Poplasen was elected over the more moderate BiIjana Plavsic, who was backed by the West. Poplasen makes no secret of his desire to see Republika Srpska (the Serb part of Bosnia) incorporated in greater Serbia. Making the long-range prognosis for lasting peace even more ominous, were the following comments made to an election supervisor, by young, well-educated Serbs: "You [the internati6nai community] want us all to live together in peace ... and that is the one thing we don't want!" "A just war is better than an unjust peace!" With deep-seated sentiments like these especially in the young-long-lasting peace is in serious doubt.

In Kosovo, what appears to the rest of the world as mysterious and irrational, the Serbs' fixation on the need to possess this province, will be the source of considerable international diplomatic angst. While Milosevic plays brinkmanship with U.N.-threatened military force, he continues to use ethnic cleansing as a national policy against the Albanians. The U.N. Security Council is faced with a four-choice dilemma as a basis for active intervention by NATO forces:

- A resolution authorizing the use of force. Every NATO government would approve, but faces a sure veto by Russia.
- A call by Albania and Macedonia for outside help so they can defend themselves against the flow of refugees from Kosovo. This would be a pre-emptive self-defense and would have no precedent.
- A claim by the western allies that Kosovo, once embroiled in combat, would come under a peacekeeping mandate that would include all of Yugoslavia. This would face sure opposition from Serbia (who signed the Dayton Accord) which claims Kosovo is an integral part of its territory an rejects any outside intervention.
- A decision to make ethnic cleansing an international crime and thus legitimize outside intervention to stop it.

It would appear, at this time, that the last choice is the most favored.

In conclusion, I feel that there are take-home messages and moral obligations that should guide our diplomacy. First, territorial aggression in Europe, if not stopped, will lead to a wider conflict that will threaten the security of all of Europe and, eventually, the United States. The use of genocide (ethnic cleansing) cannot be tolerated any-where, by any group, at any time. e must refuse to recognize borders that are accrued by violence. Protection of minorities' rights must be guaranteed under constitutional law.

The Balkan drama is not unique in the annals of human misery, but a continued reminder of the suffering caused by man's inhumanity to man.

-NSR